2012-5 Re-Examining the Role of Sticky Wages in the U.S. Great Contraction: A Multi-sector Approach by Amaral, Pedro S & MacGee, James C
Western University
Scholarship@Western
Economic Policy Research Institute. EPRI Working
Papers Economics Working Papers Archive
2012
2012-5 Re-Examining the Role of Sticky Wages in
the U.S. Great Contraction: A Multi-sector
Approach
Pedro S. Amaral
James C. MacGee
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsepri_wp
Part of the Economics Commons
Citation of this paper:
Amaral, Pedro S., James C. MacGee. "2012-5 Re-Examining the Role of Sticky Wages in the U.S. Great Contraction: A Multi-sector
Approach." Economic Policy Research Institute. EPRI Working Papers, 2012-5. London, ON: Department of Economics, University
of Western Ontario (2012).
Re-Examining the Role of Sticky Wages in 
the U.S. Great Contraction: A Multi-
sector Approach  
by  
Pedro S. Amaral and James C. MacGee  
Working Paper # 2012-5 September 2012 
Economic Policy Research Institute 
EPRI Working Paper Series
Department of Economics  
Department of Political Science 
Social Science Centre  
The University of Western Ontario  
London, Ontario, N6A 5C2  
Canada  
This working paper is available as a downloadable pdf file on our website  
http://economics.uwo.ca/centres/epri/ 
Revised September, 2015
Re-Examining the Role of Sticky Wages in the U.S.
Great Contraction: A Multi-sector Approach∗
Pedro S. Amaral
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
James C. MacGee
Western University
September 23, 2015
Abstract
We quantify the role of contractionary monetary shocks and wage rigidities in the
U.S. Great Contraction. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we find that the average
economy-wide real wage varied little over 1929-33, although real wages rose significantly
in some industries. Using a two-sector model with intermediates and wage rigidities in
one sector, we find nominal wage rigidities account for less than a fifth of the fall in
GDP over 1929-33. Intermediate linkages play a key role, as the output decline in our
benchmark is roughly half as large as in a two-sector model without intermediates.
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1 Introduction
The role of high real wages in the U.S. “Great Contraction” of 1929-33 remains controversial.
A long-standing view is that deflationary monetary policy and rigid nominal wages led to
high real wages that were a key contributor to the large fall in employment and output
(e.g., Bernanke (1995), Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000), Eichengreen (1995) and Hatton
and Thomas (2010)). Recently, however, Cole and Ohanian (2001) and others have argued
that the rise in real wages was a minor contributor to the contraction.1
In this paper, we re-examine the quantitative contribution of nominal wage rigidities and
deflationary monetary shocks to the U.S. Great Contraction. Our analysis relies on two
key elements: sectoral (industry) differences in the degree of wage rigidity and intermediate
inputs. When we incorporate these features into a two-sector model calibrated to the interwar
U.S. economy, we find that contractionary monetary shocks can account for less than a fifth
of the decline in output during this period. Intermediate linkages play a key role, as we find
that the predicted decline in output roughly doubles when we drop intermediates from our
model.
Our focus on sectoral heterogeneity in wage rigidity and intermediates is motivated by
two empirical observations. First, real wage changes varied across sectors, with wages rising
significantly in some sectors and falling rapidly in others (see Table 1). Moreover, in con-
trast to the conventional view, we find that the economy-wide real wage, constructed using
compensation and hours for all workers, was relatively flat over 1929-33. Key to this finding
is the inclusion of the earnings and hours worked of self-employed (see Figure 1.A). This is
important, as the self-employed accounted for roughly a quarter of the workforce and were
concentrated in industries (especially agriculture) where wages fell dramatically.
The second data finding is that the shifts in relative wages were accompanied by large
shifts in relative prices, with large declines in the price of less processed goods used as
intermediate inputs. This is important since many papers have pointed to a rise in the real
product wage (the nominal wage deflated by the industry output price) in manufacturing
industries as supportive evidence of high real wages during the U.S. Great Contraction (e.g.,
Bernanke (1995), Bernanke and Carey (1996)). When we examine several manufacturing
industries for which data on gross output and intermediates are available, we find that
1See Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003) and Dighe (1997). The papers in Kehoe and Prescott (2007)
examine the experiences of a number of countries.
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the pass-through of lower intermediate prices accounts for a significant share of the fall in
final gross output prices. As a result, the real value-added product wage for manufacturing
(computed using the implied value-added deflator) closely resembles our economy-wide real
wage, remaining roughly constant over the downturn. This contrasts with the established
view that manufacturing gross output real product wages (deflated by wholesale prices)
rose sharply during the early 1930s. This also suggests that modeling intermediates may be
important in assessing the impact of high real wages, since a fall in the price of intermediates
pushes up a firm’s labor demand schedule.
These facts lead us develop a two-sector model where sectors differ in the degree of
wage rigidity and in their use of intermediates. In the flexible sector, wages adjust freely to
equate labor demand and supply, while in the sticky sector, nominal wages adjust slowly.
To facilitate comparisons with the literature, we follow Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000)
and assume that sticky-sector wages are determined by Taylor nominal wage contracts, so
that hours worked depend on the firm’s real product wage. Each of the sectoral goods is
produced using capital, labor, and a sector-specific intermediate good comprised of both
sectoral goods. The final consumption/investment good is produced using the two-sectoral
goods.
To quantify the contribution of wage rigidities to the Great Contraction, we input esti-
mated money supply growth shocks from 1929:4 to 1936:4 into our calibrated model economy
and find only a modest contribution. By design, our calibration delivers a larger rise in the
aggregate real wage than observed in the data over 1929-33. This suggests that, if anything,
our experiment overestimates the fall in output due to high real wages.
The model features two mechanisms that mitigate the impact of high sectoral real wages.
First, the flexible-wage sector offers final goods producers a channel to substitute away from
the relatively more expensive sticky-sector good. Second, since the sectoral intermediate
bundle includes both flexible and sticky goods, a contractionary monetary shock results in
a lower price of intermediates relative to the sticky-sector wage. This allows sticky-sector
firms to substitute intermediates for relatively more expensive labor. As a result, changes in
relative prices drive a wedge between real product wages and real value-added wages.
Intermediate linkages across sectors play the crucial role in mitigating this impact. Com-
pared to a two-sector model without intermediates calibrated to deliver the same sticky-sector
real wage, our benchmark generates a fall in output roughly half as large. The key mech-
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anism is that the fall in the (relative) price of flexible-sector intermediates partially offsets
the effect of higher sticky-sector wages, and leads to a smaller rise in the relative price of
the sticky good. This allows the model with intermediates to match the same sticky-sector
real wage as in the two-sector model without intermediates with a smaller degree of wage
rigidity.
In contrast, we find that sectoral heterogeneity in wage rigidity by itself does not signif-
icantly mitigate the distortionary effects of high sectoral real wages. Comparing the two-
sector model without intermediates to a one-sector version calibrated to match the same
economy-wide real wage, we find similar predictions for aggregate output and employment.
This is because of offsetting mechanisms. While the flexible sector provides a channel to
substitute away from the sticky good, this also lowers the real consumption wage in the flex-
ible sector. As a result, a larger rise in the sticky-sector real wage (i.e. a “larger” friction)
is required to match the same aggregate real wage as in the one-sector environment.
Incorporating intermediates also helps address the concern that a multi-sector model
with asymmetric wage rigidities is inconsistent with the data. In an insightful discussion,
Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2001) take manufacturing as a proxy for the sticky sector and
point out that the wholesale price index (WPI) of manufactures declined by more than the
GNP deflator over 1929-1933. In contrast, in a multi-sector model without intermediates,
a contractionary monetary shock results in a smaller fall in the sticky-sector price than
in the aggregate price. Intermediates help account for this critique. In Section 2.3, we
construct an implied value-added price deflator for manufacturing and find that it falls by
less than the GNP deflator, similarly to what happens in the model. This is due to the pass-
through of lower intermediate prices into the manufacturing gross output price, highlighting
the importance of accounting for input-output relationships during periods of large relative
price shifts.
There is a large literature debating the contribution of deflation and wage rigidity to the
Great Contraction.2 Our paper is most closely related to Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000)
and Cole and Ohanian (2001), who reach very different conclusions. While we share with
Cole and Ohanian (2001) the view that sectoral heterogeneity in wages was an important
factor in the Great Contraction, we differ both in incorporating intermediate linkages and in
explicitly modeling nominal rigidities in a two-sector general equilibrium model. In contrast
2This is part of a broader literature debating the contribution of monetary factors to the Great Contraction
that dates back to Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
4
to Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) – whose one-sector framework is nested as a limiting case
of our model – our results suggest that high real wages were not the predominant factor in
the large fall in output during the Great Contraction. Our findings suggest that the key
reason Cole and Ohanian (2001) find a smaller role for high real wages than Bordo, Erceg,
and Evans (2000) do, is not the multi-sector structure of their model, but rather the fact
that their calibration targets a smaller increase in the aggregate real wage.
In recent work, Cole, Ohanian, and Leung (2005) revisit the conclusions of Eichengreen
and Sachs (1985) and Bernanke and Carey (1996), that differences in the timing according
to which countries abandoned the gold standard account for the observed cross-country de-
flations and output declines. They find evidence of the former, but not the latter causal
relationship. Ohanian (2009) argues that a large fraction of the fall in output can be at-
tributed to the threat of unionization in manufacturing, which allowed President Hoover to
convince manufacturing firms to keep their wages high, while reducing the length of their
workweek in exchange for protection from unions. Unlike these papers, we show that explic-
itly taking into account intermediate linkages significantly reduces the impact of high real
product wages on the output decline during the Great Contraction.
Our work is also related to a large literature on cyclical movements in relative prices.
Means (1966) highlighted the large shifts in relative prices across industries during the Great
Depression, while Neal (1942) examined whether movements in relative prices across man-
ufacturing industries could be accounted for by shifts in input prices. Our paper differs
from these studies in its quantitative theory emphasis and focus on real wages. More recent
work has found that prices of intermediate goods, relative to both final goods and average
wages, move procyclically in the post-war period (e.g. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989)),
and that monetary contractions lower the relative price of less processed to more processed
goods (e.g. Clark (1999)). While we find similar effects from monetary shocks over 1929-
33, we differ in our focus on the quantitative contribution of wage rigidities to the Great
Contraction.3
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents several key
facts on aggregate and sectoral wages and hours and on the impact of shifts in the price of
intermediates on U.S. manufacturing wholesale prices. Section 3 outlines our baseline two-
3Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2009) find that sectoral heterogeneity in price rigidities and inter-
mediate linkages can help account for the transmission of monetary shocks. Huang, Liu, and Phaneuf (2004)
argue that shifts in the level of intermediate usage can account for changes in the cyclicality of real wages.
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sector model with intermediates. Section 4 quantifies the impact of contractionary monetary
shocks in our model. The final section offers a brief conclusion.
2 Data
While the labor market figures prominently in many explanations of the Great Depression,
surprisingly little work has explored the extent and importance of heterogeneity in wages and
hours worked across industries.4 This leads us to construct aggregate and sectoral measures
of real wages and hours worked during the Great Contraction.
In contrast to conventional wisdom, we find that the average real wage for all workers over
1929-1933 barely rose. This is mainly due to our inclusion of the self-employed, whose income
fell dramatically during this period. At the industry level, we find substantial sectoral shifts
in relative wages coincided with large shifts in relative prices across industries over 1929-
1933. These facts are related, as the self-employed were concentrated in sectors where real
wages declined. In contrast, self-employed workers were a small fraction of the workforce in
industries where real wages rose. Consistent with differential degrees of wage rigidity, hours
worked tended to decline more in industries where relative wages rose.
While our first finding might be interpreted as evidence against high real wages being an
important factor in the downturn, the second, based on sectoral data, suggests this conclusion
is not warranted. These sectoral differences lead us to develop a multi-sector environment
in Section 3 to quantify the role of real wage rigidities in the Great Contraction.
2.1 Average Real (Consumption) Wage
Since direct measures of hourly wages exist for only a few industries, we use estimates of
hours worked and total labor income to construct hourly wages. Our measure of total
hours worked is the product of persons engaged in production (full-time equivalent (FTE)
employees plus sole-proprietors) and average hours worked per FTE worker.5 Since our hours
worked measure includes sole-proprietors, we define total labor income as total employee
4This reflects the limited data on wages and hours worked outside of manufacturing and agriculture.
Cole and Ohanian (2001) document the fall in agricultural wages relative to manufacturing, while Cole and
Ohanian (2004) focus on New Deal policy induced heterogeneity over 1934-1939.
5We use the Denison (1962) economy-wide average hours estimates for comparability with Bordo, Erceg,
and Evans (2000). This series is similar to that of Kendrick (1961) over 1929-39.
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compensation plus 60 percent of sole-proprietors’ income.6 The nominal wage is total labor
income divided by total hours, which we deflate using the Balke and Gordon (1986) GNP
deflator. When necessary, we refer to this as the real consumption wage to distinguish it
from industry level real product wages, computed using industry deflators, which we examine
in Section 2.3.
Our estimate of average real consumption wages (All-workers in Figure 1.A) exhibits
little increase during the downturn, rising only after the introduction of New Deal policies
in the mid-1930s. The main reason our estimate differs from the conventional wisdom is the
inclusion of the self-employed. This can be seen by comparing our average wage series with
that of employees only, which rises by roughly 12 percent over 1929 to 1932 (see Figure 1.A).
Should the self-employed be taken into account when computing average economy-wide
real wages? Standard theory suggests they should, as the workhorse stochastic growth
model treats hours worked by employees and self-employed symmetrically. A more practical
argument for inclusion is that the self-employed accounted for over a fifth of the workforce
in 1929. Moreover, informed contemporaneous observers reported that many self-employed
closely resembled comparable wage workers.7
Given the large impact that self-employed workers have on the average wage, are our
findings robust to alternative estimates of average self-employed hourly earnings? One check
is to replace our measure of self-employed earnings with the hourly earnings of (employed)
agricultural workers.8 This is a reasonable proxy for the opportunity cost of sole-proprietors
since over half of self-employed workers were in agriculture.9 As Figure 1.A illustrates, this
exercise yields an economy-wide real wage estimate (All-workers wag proxy) similar to our
benchmark. This suggests that excluding the self-employed from the calculation of average
wages effectively under-weights industries where wages fell during the Great Contraction.
6Changes in real wages are not very sensitive to reasonable (constant) values for the labor share.
7For example, a BLS report stated that: ”...there is a basis in the economic status of many farm operators
for classifying them with wage earners.” (pg. 66, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1939)).
8Specifically, we divide the Alston and Hatton (1991) estimate of monthly earnings of agricultural workers
by an estimate of hours worked in agriculture (total hours from Kendrick (1961) divided by Persons Engaged
in Farms from the BEA). The average wage is the weighted average of the employee average wage series and
the agricultural wage, where the weights are the fraction of FTE Persons Engaged (i.e., FTE Employees/FTE
Persons Engaged and FTE Sole-Proprietors/FTE Persons Engaged).
9Johnson (1953) used the 1940 Census and found that the wages of workers who migrated from farms to
urban areas was close to that of urban workers of the same age and sex.
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2.2 Industry Level Estimates of Wages and Hours
While the large decline in agricultural wages relative to manufacturing (over 40 percent)
over 1929-33 is well known, the lack of wage data for other industries has led to debate
over whether shifts in relative wages occurred across other sectors. To address this, we
construct estimates of wages and hours worked for construction, wholesale trade, retail trade,
transportation and public utilities, finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE), services, and
government, in addition to agriculture and manufacturing.
To compute industry wages, we divide total labor income by hours worked. Our measure
of total labor income is labor compensation plus 60 percent of sole-proprietors’ income with
inventory and Capital Cost Allowance (CCA) adjustments. We use Kendrick (1961) hours
worked estimates for agriculture, government, manufacturing, mining, and transportation
plus public utilities.10 For the remaining private non-farm industries, total hours are based
on Kendrick’s estimate of private non-farm hours less hours worked in the aforementioned
non-farm industries. Lacking better information, we apportion these hours to each industry
using the number of persons engaged in production. All wages are deflated using the GNP
deflator, and quantities are per working-age person.
We begin by comparing our estimates of agriculture and manufacturing wages with direct
(survey) estimates of wages.11 Panel B in Figure 1 plots our imputed real wage series as well
as commonly cited real wage series for each sector. Our estimate of the manufacturing wage
tracks the National Industrial Conference Board’s (NICB) average manufacturing wage series
closely. Compared to the Alston and Hatton (1991) farm laborer wage series, our agricultural
real wage initially declines faster, before rebounding over 1932-1935. This larger fall is not
surprising, as most (roughly two-thirds) of the workforce in agriculture were sole-proprietors
and there were large swings in farm income during the Depression. Our wage estimates thus
imply a slightly larger decline in agricultural wages relative to manufacturing than other
estimates. Consistent with the shift in relative wages, manufacturing hours declined by over
40 percent, while hours worked in agriculture declined very little over 1929-32 (see Table 1).
The estimates for the other industries, also shown in Table 1, provide further evidence of
10If we construct hours worked using persons engaged in production and average hours from Denison
(1962), we obtain similar hours worked (and hence wages) in agriculture, and slightly smaller declines in
hours worked in manufacturing (and hence larger wage declines). This estimate of the manufacturing wage
closely tracks the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1939) series for entry wages in manufacturing.
11In 1929, these industries each accounted for roughly 20 percent of employment and over a third of GDP.
value-added in agriculture was slightly less than half that of manufacturing.
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large shifts in relative wages during the downturn. They were flat or declined in agriculture,
construction, retail trade and FIRE. The workforce in these industries included a significant
number of sole-proprietors, and together accounted for more than four-fifths of all self-
employed workers (see the last row of Table 1). In the remaining sectors, real wages increased
over 1929-33, with larger increases in transportation and government than manufacturing.
While we lack the data to construct industry-specific price deflators, the Cost of Living
Index (COLI) data presented in Table 2 shows that the shifts in relative prices largely
coincide with those in sectoral wages. Agriculture (Food) and FIRE (Rent), two of the
industries where real wages fell, experienced the largest price declines, while Utilities (Fuel)
and Services (the better part of Miscellaneous), industries where real wages rose, had the
smallest.12
This heterogeneity in real wages across sectors motivates the two-sector model we con-
struct in Section 3, where the degree of wage rigidity varies by sector. For simplicity, we refer
to the sectors as sticky and flexible. As a simple guide to map the data into the model frame-
work, we allocate industries where real wages rose to the sticky sector (i.e., manufacturing,
transportation and communications, government, mining, services, and wholesale trade) and
industries where real wages fell (i.e., agriculture, construction, retail trade and FIRE) to the
flexible sector. The flexible industries accounted for roughly 41 percent of GDP in 1929.
Panels C and D in Figure 1 plot our sectoral estimates of real wages (computed using the
GNP deflator) and hours per adult as log-deviations from their third quarter of 1929 values.
We use the relative share of hours worked in each industry in 1929 as weights in computing
these series. Consistent with a story of sectoral heterogeneity in wage rigidities, real wages
rose more, and hours fell more, in the sticky than in the flexible sector.
2.3 Real Product Wages, Intermediates and Sectoral Prices
A rise in real product wages accompanied by a decline in hours and output is often cited as
evidence for how the deflation of the early 1930s led to a large fall in GDP (e.g., Bernanke
(1995), Eichengreen (1995), Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) and Bernanke and Carey (1996)).
This is based on the rational that the firm’s demand for labor is a function of the nominal
12One issue is that consumption prices are a weighted average of the gross output prices of the sectoral
good (e.g., food items) and retail and wholesale services. In the Web Appendix we show that breaking out
the distribution component strengthens our conclusion on relative price movements.
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wage and the firm’s output price. In practice, data availability means that most empirical
work has employed manufacturing wages deflated by some measure of wholesale prices.13
Our analysis challenges this interpretation of the data. Our critique is based on the large
fall in the price of less processed goods used as intermediates, relative to final goods, during
the early 1930s (see Figure 1.E). This relative price change impacts measured real product
wages since sectoral price indexes such as the manufacturing WPI are gross output prices. By
construction, gross output prices are a weighted average of an implied value-added deflator
(i.e. the weighted average of wages and capital costs) and the price of intermediates. Since
the share of intermediates in manufacturing production costs exceeded 50 percent, the pass-
through of lower intermediate costs significantly reduced the gross output price (i.e. the WPI
for manufactured goods).14 This implies an upward bias in the conventionally measured real
product wage.
To examine the quantitative importance of this intermediate channel, we construct im-
plicit value-added deflators for the manufacturing sector as well as for seven frequently
studied manufacturing industries, over 1929-33. For these industries, we assemble data on
quantities and prices of intermediates and gross output. We employ a sectoral CES produc-
tion function to back out the implied value-added deflator:15
Yi = [αi (V Ai)
ρi + (1− αi)Qρii ]
1
ρi ,
where V Ai denotes the value-added components (a mix of labor and capital), Qi denotes
intermediate goods, and Yi is gross output in industry i. If firms are price takers, the
value-added prices, pi,V A, the intermediates’ prices, pi,Q, and gross output prices, pi, satisfy:
pi =
[(
pi,V A
ai
)ri
+
(
pi,Q
1− ai
)ri] 1ri
, (1)
where ri =
ρi
ρi−1 , and ai = α
1
ρi
i .
13Eichengreen and Hatton (1988) argue that the manufacturing WPI – a sub-index of the WPI – is the
appropriate deflator, since the WPI includes both manufactured goods and commodities. We show that use
of the manufacturing WPI is not sufficient to control for the large decline in unprocessed good prices due to
the pass-through of lower intermediate prices into manufacturing prices.
14Recent work finds that factor prices changes pass through into output prices (e.g. Bils and Chang
(2000)).
15This functional form is consistent with the model we use in section 3.
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To back out the value-added deflator, pi,V A, implied by gross output and intermediate
prices we first parameterize the production function. We set ρi = −.45, implying an elas-
ticity of substitution between value-added and intermediates of 0.69, the mean estimate of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) for U.S. manufacturing. We set αi to match an inter-
mediates’ share of expenditure in manufacturing during the interwar period of roughly 55
percent.16 The manufacturing WPI is our gross output price measure, pi, and the WPI for
semi-manufactured goods proxies for the price of intermediates, pi,Q (see the last row in
Table 3).17
Figure 1.F plots our estimate of the manufacturing valued-added deflator, as well as the
manufacturing WPI and the GNP deflator. Taking the pass-through of lower intermediate
prices into account, the implied manufacturing value-added deflator falls by less than the
GNP deflator. As a result, we find that controlling for the fall in intermediate prices (by
using our imputed value-added deflators to compute real product wages) has a large impact
on real product wages. While the ratio of nominal wages to the manufacturing WPI increased
over 1929 to 1933, real product wages adjusted for intermediate prices were roughly constant
over 1929-33, as the fall in nominal wages in manufacturing roughly equaled the fall in our
implied value-added deflator (see the last row in Table 4).
As a robustness check, we examine seven manufacturing industries for which data on input
and output prices (WPI), intermediates shares and average hourly wages are available.18 The
intermediate share of gross output for these industries in 1929 varied from roughly 54 percent
in Iron and Steel to nearly 87 percent in meat-packing. As Table 3 shows, industries with
larger declines in intermediate prices tended to have larger declines in their output prices.
This effect was larger for industries with relatively less processed intermediates such as meat-
packing, leather, and wool, which had larger price declines than those using relatively more
processed goods.19 With the exception of iron and steel (whose measured input prices were
flat), the implied value-added deflator for each industry (constructed in the same way as for
16The intermediate share is the ratio of intermediates to gross output from the Census of Manufactures.
17This understates the pass-through of intermediate prices since raw material prices declined by more.
18These industries were examined in Bernanke (1986), as well as Bernanke and Parkinson (1991) and
Bordo and Evans (1995) who replace meat-packing with petroleum and include the rubber industry. These
were all relatively large industries, with meat-packing, iron and steel and automotives each accounting for
over 5 percent of total manufacturing gross output.
19The one industry which faced flat input prices was iron and steel, as iron ore and coke had very small
price declines. Interestingly, iron and steel featured a significant degree of vertical integration, as a large
fraction of iron ore production was owned by steel producers (Hines (1951)).
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manufacturing as a whole) fell by more than the corresponding industry’s WPI.20 As a result,
in six of the seven industries, real product wages measured using our implied value-added
deflator are 7 to 80 percent below the WPI-deflated measure, and actually decline through
1933 (see Table 4). This industry-level pattern is consistent with the manufacturing average,
which shows relatively small movements in real wages over 1929-1933.
This leads us to two conclusions. First, the pass-through of intermediate prices has
a significant impact on the interpretation of manufacturing price changes, and challenges
the standard view that real product wages in manufacturing rose significantly during the
downturn. Second, our estimates of real product wages constructed using value-added price
deflators increase by less than the real consumption wage (the nominal wage deflated by
the GNP deflator). This means that explicitly modeling intermediates may affect the way
monetary shocks are transmitted in the context of a two-sector model where the degree of
wage stickiness differs across sectors. This motivates our analysis in the following sections,
where we use a model with intermediate linkages across industries and sectoral differences in
wage rigidity to quantify the contribution of wage rigidities to the U.S. Great Contraction.
3 A Two-sector Model with Intermediates
Motivated by our empirical observations, we develop a two-sector model with intermediates.
Both sectors use capital, labor, and intermediate goods as inputs, but differ in the mix
of intermediates as well as in how wages adjust and the labor markets clear. The flexible
wage sector has a competitive labor market where wages adjust each period to equate labor
demand and supply. The sticky wage sector builds on Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) and
features Taylor nominal wage contracting. In this sector, the firm (the short side of the
market) decides how much to hire given the (real) product wage. The two-sectoral goods
are used to produce the final consumption and/or investment good.
A key issue in any sectoral environment is how to model reallocation. We allow capital to
move freely across sectors, but assume workers cannot switch sectors. Hours worked in the
sticky sector are determined by firms, and do not enter the household’s utility function. This
amplifies the effect of wage rigidities in our framework, and thus biases our analysis in favour
of finding that high real wages were a significant factor in accounting for the downturn.
20See the Web Appendix for the industry deflators.
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3.1 Environment
Households
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived stand-in household with preferences
defined over streams of consumption of the final good, {Ct}∞t=0, hours of work in the flexible
wage sector (sector 1), {L1,t}∞t=0 and real money balances,
{
Mt
Pt
}∞
t=0
, where Pt is the price
of the final good. The household chooses consumption, hours of work in the flexible sector,
nominal bond holdings, Bt, money holdings, Mt, capital in each sector, Ki,t+1, holdings of
intermediate goods Qi,t, and sales of intermediate goods (bought last period) to firms, Qij,t,
so as to solve:
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
logCt − µL
1− σLL
1−σL
1,t + µM log
(
Mt
Pt
)]
(2)
s.t. Bt = (1 +Rt−1)Bt−1 +
2∑
i=1
(Ji,tKi,t +Wi,tLi,t) +
2∑
i=1
pii,t +Xt
+
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
P si,tQij,t −
(
Mt −Mt−1 + PtCt + Pt
2∑
i=1
Ii,t +
2∑
i=1
Pi,tQi,t
)
, (3)
Ki,t+1 = (1− δi)Ki,t + Ii,t, i = 1, 2, (4)
Qi,t−1 = Qii,t +Qij,t, i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2, (5)
where R is the nominal interest rate on bonds, X is a lump-sum cash transfer from the
government, and Ji, Wi, Ii, Li, δi, and pii are sectoral variables: the rental rate of capital,
the nominal wage, investment, hours worked, the depreciation rate of capital and sectoral
nominal profits, respectively. Qij denotes intermediates produced by sector i and used in
sector j. Our timing has the household purchasing period t−1 intermediate goods from both
sectors, Qi,t−1, at prices Pi,t−1. At the beginning of period t the household sells its holdings
of intermediates at price P si,t. Intermediate goods are akin to investment with this timing.
Firms
Sectoral output is produced using a CES production function:
Yi,t =
[
αi
(
Kθii,tL
1−θi
i,t
)ρi
+ (1− αi) min {Q1i,t, χiQ2i,t}ρi
] 1
ρi , i = 1, 2
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where the two intermediates inputs are perfect complements. Firms take sectoral prices,
Pi,t, factor prices and intermediates prices as given when making production decisions to
maximize static profits:
maxpii,t = Pi,tYi,t −
2∑
j=1
P sj,tQji,t −Ki,tJi,t −Wi,tLi,t, (6)
where Qji are intermediates produced in sector j and used in sector i.
Final output producers buy sectoral goods, Y ni,t, and take sectoral prices and the final
good price as given when maximizing profits:
maxPt
(
η
(
Y n1,t
)ρ
+ (1− η) (Y n2,t)ρ)1/ρ − 2∑
i=1
Pi,tY
n
i,t, (7)
where ρ < 1 and the elasticity of substitution is σ = 1
1−ρ . The sum of intermediate goods
bought by households and final output producers has to equal the total amount of sectoral
goods produced: Yi,t = Y
n
i,t +Qi,t, i = 1, 2.
The final good, Yt =
(
η
(
Y n1,t
)ρ
+ (1− η) (Y n2,t)ρ)1/ρ, can be transformed into consumption
or allocated to investment in either sector:
Yt = Ct +
2∑
i=1
Ii,t. (8)
Wage Setting
While wages adjust freely in sector 1, they are subject to Taylor-type contracts in sector
2.21 Labor is divided into four equally-sized cohorts. Each period, the contract wages of one
cohort are adjusted. The nominal wage the firm pays is a geometric average of the cohort
contract wages:
W2,t = x
φ0
t x
φ1
t−1x
φ2
t−2x
φ3
t−3, (9)
where φi are cohort weights that sum to 1.
The contract wage in period t, xt, depends on the current and future expected nominal
21The Taylor contract assumption makes our results comparable to Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000).
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wages and labor gaps relative to steady-state, so that:
log xt = φ0 logW2,t + γ(L2,t − L¯2) + Et
{
φ1 logW2,t+1 + γ(L2,t+1 − L¯2)
+ φ2 logW2,t+2 + γ(L2,t+2 − L¯2) + φ3 logW2,t+3 + γ(L2,t+3 − L¯2)
}
, (10)
where γ is a labor-gap adjustment parameter to be estimated.
Setting cohort weights to be the same, φi = 0.25, repeated substitution of (9) into (10)
yields the current contract wage as a function of past and expected future contract wages
and the current and expected labor gaps:
log xt =
1
12
log xt−3 +
1
6
log xt−2 +
1
4
log xt−1 + γ
(
L2,t − L¯2
)
(11)
+ Et
{1
4
log xt+1 +
1
6
log xt+2
1
12
log xt+3 +
3∑
k=1
γ
(
L2,t+k − L¯2
)}
.
Money
The growth rate of the stock of money follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
gt = logMt − logMt−1, (12)
gt+1 = g + ρmgt + t+1, (13)
where the innovation t+1 is iid N(0, σ
2
g).
Equilibrium
Given the law of motion for the growth rate of money, the nominal variables are non-
stationary, therefore we rescale them by the stock of money. Let P˜t =
Pt
Mt
, B˜t =
Bt
Mt
, P˜it =
Pit
Mt
,
P˜ sit =
P sit
Mt
, J˜it =
Jit
Mt
, W˜it =
Wit
Mt
, X˜it =
Xit
Mt
, and x˜t =
xt
Mt
.
Given g0, M0, Ki,0, and the laws of motion (12) and (13), an equilibrium is quantities{
B˜t, Ct, Ki,t, Qi,t, Yi,t, Y
n
i,t, Li,t, X˜t, pii,t
}∞
t=0
, and prices
{
J˜t, P˜t, P˜i,t, P˜
s
i,t, Rt, W˜i,t, x˜t
}∞
t=0
, such
that households, firms in each sector and final good producers solve the problems described
above subject to market clearing conditions. In equilibrium, B˜t = 0, as there is one rep-
resentative household; p˜ii,t = 0, as the sectoral technologies are CRS; and the government
transfer has to equal the newly printed money: Xt = Mt −Mt−1.
The household’s and firms’ first-order conditions, together with the wage setting equa-
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tions (9), and (10) and the market clearing conditions for the final and sectoral goods con-
stitute the set of necessary conditions. We solve the model by log-linearizing around the
non-stochastic steady-state and applying the techniques described in Uhlig (1999).
3.2 Calibration
Each of the four contract periods lasts one quarter. We set β = 0.99, which implies an
annual risk-free return of roughly 4%. The quarterly depreciation rate of capital for both
sectors is 0.025. We choose σL = −0.5 so that the Frisch elasticity is 2, and given this, we
set µL so that steady-state total market time, L¯1 + L¯2, is one third. Since µM has no effect
on the dynamics of the system we follow Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) in setting it.
We allocate industries to the flexible or the sticky sector based on whether the industry
real wage increased or decreased during the Great Contraction. To compute the labor share
in each sector, we follow the convention that ambiguous income sources (such as proprietors’
income) breakdown between capital and labor income in the same proportion as unambiguous
income sources. Since our model abstracts from a government sector and residential housing,
we follow Gomme and Rupert (2007) in excluding income from these sources. Unambigu-
ous labor income is total compensation of private employees less housing compensation of
employees, while unambiguous capital income is rental income plus net interest income plus
corporate profits plus capital consumption for private, nonresidential capital less housing
rental income, housing net interest income and housing corporate profits.22 The average
labor share in 1929 is roughly 0.7 in both sectors, which leads us to set θ1 = θ2 = 0.3 (i.e.
the capital share of value-added is 30 %).
The targets for sectoral production parameters (αi, ρi, and χi) are: (i) the gross output
share of intermediates in the flexible (sticky) sector is 32% (38%); (ii) the share of flexible
intermediates in total intermediates is 39% (31%) in the flexible (sticky) sector; and (iii) the
elasticity of substitution between value-added and intermediates in both sectors is 0.69.
Our sectoral estimates are based on the weighted average of industry level data. For
manufacturing and transportation we use the 1929 input-output table of Leontief (1951)
and the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. to estimate value-added shares (0.45 and 0.66,
respectively) and a share of intermediates coming from the flexible sector of 0.35 and 0.26,
22Our measure of private sector CCA excludes sole-proprietors’ income. Although this is not significant
for the economy-wide average, it does matter for the labor share at the industry level.
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respectively.23 In mining, our value-added estimate is 0.83, which is the average value across
1919 and 1954 (Table Db1-11, Historical Statistics of the United States). Given the limited
input-output data for service sector industries, we use 2002 Census data on business expenses
in trade, which lumps wholesale and retail together. This implies a value-added share of
77% and a share of flexible intermediates of 25%. We assume that the numbers for services,
communications and government are the same as for trade. Turning to the flexible sector,
the value-added share in gross output in agriculture in 1929 was 0.49, with a share of flexible
intermediates of 0.69 (Leontief (1951)). The 1930 Census data for construction implies a
value-added share of 0.57. Construction uses very little flexible-sector inputs, so we make
the educated guess that their share is 10% (we use the same number for mining). We assume
that the numbers for FIRE are the same as those in trade.
To convert these values into sector averages, we weight each of these industry shares by
their value-added share in their respective sector. This implies an intermediate share in the
flexible sector of 1 − α1 = 0.316, 39% of which is allocated to flexible intermediates. For
the sticky sector, the intermediate share is 1 − α2 = 0.384, with 31 % being allocated to
flexible intermediates. The elasticity of substitution between value-added and intermediates
is set to 0.69, which is the mean value estimated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) for
U.S. manufacturing industries. To complete the sectoral part of our calibration, we assume
intermediates are perfect complements.24
The elasticity of substitution between sectoral goods in the final good aggregator, 1
1−ρ ,
and the share of flexible goods in final good production, η, are jointly calibrated to match
the flexible-sector share of GDP in 1929 (0.42 according to our sectoral breakdown) and to
minimize the squared distance between model and data, in this same share, over 1930-33.
Similarly, in calibrating γ, the crucial parameter regulating nominal wage adjustment in
the sticky sector, we minimize the squared distance between this sector’s real consumption
wage, W2
P
, in the model and the data over 1929-33.
Our raw money supply measure is M1 from Friedman and Schwartz (1963)(Table A-1).
Consistent with our model, we use M1 per adult when estimating the parameters in the
money growth rate’s law of motion, equation (13), from the second quarter of 1922 to the
last quarter of 1928. The estimates we obtain are gˆ = 0.0015 and ρˆm = 0.44.
23Since Leontief (1951) does not distinguish between investment and consumption goods, we assume that
flows from iron and steel manufacturers to other industries are investment, which we assign to final output.
24In section 4.1.1 we relax this assumption and conduct some sensitivity analysis.
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A summary of parameter values and targets appears in Table 5.
4 Real Wage Rigidities and the Great Contraction
We use our calibrated model to quantity the contribution of wage rigidities to the Great
Contraction. Our strategy follows that of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000), as we input
the estimated money supply growth shocks from 1929:4 to 1936:4 into our calibrated model
economy.25 To evaluate the role of intermediates, we replicate our baseline experiment in a
version of our model without intermediate linkages.
Our experiments yield two main insights. First, contrary to the established view, we find
that deflation and wage rigidity account for less than a fifth of the fall in output during the
Great Contraction. Second, we find that it is intermediates rather than a two-sector model
per se that is key to our results. The impact of sectoral wage rigidities on GDP is nearly
twice as large in a model economy without intermediates than in our benchmark (see Figure
6.A). Moreover, we show that a one-sector version of the model delivers the same aggregate
fall in output as the two-sector model without intermediates – provided the real wage rigidity
is calibrated so that the real consumption wage in the two environments are the same.
4.1 Impact of Contractionary Monetary Shocks
Figures 2 and 3 show the key aggregate and sectoral variables (along with their data coun-
terparts) that result from inputting the estimated money supply growth shocks from 1929:4
to 1936:4 into our calibrated model economy.
We find that wage rigidities can account for only a fifth of the fall in GDP at the trough
(Figure 2.A). This is an upper bound estimate, as the aggregate real wage in the model
(averaging across the flexible and sticky sectors) is higher than that observed from 1929 to
1934 (Figure 2.C). Despite the higher real wage, the fall in hours in the model is less than
half of that observed in the data (Figure 2.D). The aggregate price of the final consump-
tion/investment good closely tracks the GNP deflator until 1935 (Figure 2.B).
Behind the aggregate numbers are large shifts in relative sectoral wages and prices due to
the sectoral asymmetries in wage rigidity. These shifts, in turn, result in changes in sectoral
25We assume that the economy was at its steady-state in the third quarter of 1929. In the Web Appendix
we present an experiment where we relax this assumption.
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real product wages and real consumption wages, which interact with intermediate linkages to
shape the sectoral responses to a contractionary monetary shock (see Figure 3).
While prices and nominal wages decline in both sectors, they fall by less in the sticky
sector, where staggered wage contracts cause nominal wages to decline slower than prices
following a contractionary monetary shock. This means that the aggregate price level declines
by more than the sticky-sector price, but by less than the flexible-sector price (Figure 3.C
and D). It also means that the sticky real consumption wage rises by more than the sticky
real product wage.
Our calibration strategy chooses the wage rigidity parameter, γ, so as to match the
real consumption wage in the sticky sector during the contraction (Figure 3.H). Since the
model generates a larger decline in the sticky-sector price than in the data (Figure 3.D),
the sticky real product wage increases more than in the data. As hours in the sticky sector
are determined by the firm’s labor demand schedule, they are decreasing in the real product
wage. This biases our calibration strategy towards finding a larger decline in output.
Intermediates mitigate the impact of high real wages in the sticky sector. The price of
the sticky-sector intermediate bundle falls relative to the cost of labor, since it is a weighted
average of the sectoral goods prices (see Figure 3.I). This induces a substitution of interme-
diates for sticky-sector labor, which increases the ratio of intermediates to hours (notice how
intermediates usage in Figure 3.J fall less than hours in Figure 3.F). In effect, this enables
the sticky firm to substitute flexible-sector labor (embodied in the intermediates) for more
expensive sticky labor. Indirectly, this further offsets the impact of high sticky wages by
pushing up the marginal product of labor.
In the flexible sector, hours depend on labor supply and demand. The (nominal) labor
supply schedule falls, despite a negative wealth effect, because the aggregate price falls. The
labor demand schedule is lowered by the fall in the relative price of the flexible good, as
well as by the relative increase in the cost of intermediates. This results in a decline in both
flexible hours and the flexible real consumption wage, while the real product wage remains
roughly constant, as sectoral prices and wages fall by similar amounts. As a consequence,
the sticky real consumption wage rises by more than the economy-wide real consumption
wage (as the flexible real consumption wage falls).
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4.1.1 Sensitivity analysis
To assess the sensitivity of our quantitative conclusions, we repeat our experiment for several
alternative values of the elasticity of substitution both at the sectoral level as well as in final
good production. In these experiments we adjust the elasticity of substitution in final good
production, ρ, the share of each sector in final production η, and the wage rigidity parameter,
γ, to match our aggregate calibration targets.
Figure 4 compares our benchmark economy with intermediates to two alternatives: one
where the elasticity of substitution between value-added and intermediates is 1 (labeled
“Sectoral C-D”), and another where the sectoral intermediate aggregator is Cobb-Douglas
(labeled “Intermediates C-D”) instead of Leontief.26 In both cases, GDP falls by more than
in the benchmark (panel A). In the absence of sectoral differences in wage rigidity, a mone-
tary shock would not impact relative sectoral prices. Thus, the larger change in the relative
price of sticky to flexible goods (see panel B) indicates the sectoral wage rigidity is more
distortionary than in the benchmark. Why does the sticky good become relatively more
expensive compared to the benchmark? In the “Sectoral C-D” case, flexible-sector firms
substitute away from intermediates and into (cheaper) labor, while sticky-sector firms sub-
stitute away from expensive labor and into intermediates. Since flexible labor is relatively
cheaper than intermediates, the flexible good becomes relatively cheaper. In the “Interme-
diates C-D” case, firms in both sectors substitute away from sticky intermediates and into
flexible ones. This causes a relative increase in the sticky-sector price for 2 reasons: (i) sticky
intermediates have a larger share in sticky production than in flexible production, and (ii)
while the sticky sector’s real consumption wage path is the same as in the benchmark, it is
lower in the flexible sector, which induces substitution towards (relatively) cheaper labor.
This leads to a larger output decline than in the benchmark for two reasons. First, the
aggregate price level declines by less (recall the sticky sector accounts for nearly 60% of
value-added output). Since our calibration targets the same real sticky consumption wage,
this results in a larger wage rigidity parameter. This parameter change accounts for nearly
one-third of the larger output decline. Second, the shift in prices impacts sectoral labor
demand and output. In the flexible sector, the larger fall in prices and lower intermediate
usage pushes down labor demand and output. In the sticky sector, the reduced use of
26See the supplementary appendix we report the results if we set the the elasticity of substitution between
value-added and intermediates to 0.5 or 0.9.
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intermediates acts like a negative productivity shock, which is only partially offset by the
relatively higher price of the sticky good. As a result, output falls by more in both sectors
than in the benchmark.
Finally, the aggregate results are not sensitive to (local) variation in the elasticity of
substitution between sectoral goods in final good production. In our benchmark, ρ is chosen
to match the observed path of sectoral value-added shares. Figure 5 shows that varying
the elasticity of substitution up to 1 (ρ = 0) and down to one third (ρ = −2) does not
substantially change aggregate GDP (panel A).27 However, moving away from our benchmark
towards Cobb-Douglas (ρ = 0) is inconsistent with the observed fall in the flexible sector’s
share of GDP (panel B), as it generates a much smaller shift in relative prices.
While the first two sensitivity experiments suggest a larger role for wage rigidities dur-
ing the Great Contraction, they carry important counterfactual implications. The “Sectoral
C-D” case, unlike our benchmark specification, is inconsistent with the fact that the in-
termediate share of gross output in manufacturing (agriculture) fell (rose) over 1929-33.28
Regarding the elasticity of substitution between different types of intermediates, which we
set to one in the ”Intermediates C-D” case and assume is zero in the benchmark, it seems
reasonable to think that the substitutability between fairly granular inputs (e.g. substituting
steel for wood in automobiles) at such a short horizon should be low.
4.2 Are Intermediates Quantitatively Important?
To quantify the effect of intermediates, we drop them from the model economy and repeat
our experiment. We leave the other features of the model economy, as well as the aggregate
calibration targets, unchanged.29
While the outcomes are qualitatively similar to those of the benchmark economy, the
quantitative impact of wage rigidities is much larger. In the economy without intermediates,
the fall in output is almost twice as large as in our benchmark, accounting for nearly 40% of
the fall in GDP from 1929 to 1933 (Figure 6.A). This is driven by a larger decline in hours
worked (Figure 6.D). Importantly, this larger fall in hours occurs despite a smaller increase
27When we vary ρ, the other parameters are chosen to continue to match the targets in Table 5.
28An elasticity of one between between value-added and intermediates is well above our benchmark (0.69),
which is already at the higher end of the estimates in the literature. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) cite
estimates roughly half as large as the one we use, which would lead to even smaller decreases in GDP.
29The parameter values that change in the no-intermediates economy are reported in Table 5, under
“No-intermediates version”.
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in the average real wage for all workers (Figure 6.C) than in the economy with intermediates.
The sectoral variables follow a similar pattern, with output and hours falling by more in
the model without intermediates, despite lower real product wages in both sectors. In the
flexible sector, this is driven mainly by lower wages, as the flexible-sector price follows similar
paths with and without intermediates (see Figure 7.I). In the sticky sector, the smaller rise
in the real product wage is mainly due to a smaller decline in the sticky-sector price (relative
to the final good) in the economy without intermediates (compare Figure 6.B to Figure 7.J).
If the sticky real product wage is higher and sticky hours are determined by the firms’
labor demand schedule, how can hours fall by less in the benchmark economy? The key
reason is that the intermediate bundle uses both sectoral goods. Since the flexible-sector
price falls relative to the sticky good, the price of the intermediate bundle sticky-sector firms
buy falls relative to the price of labor. This relative price drop acts as a positive shift in the
marginal product of labor schedule by increasing the ratio of intermediates to labor, which
partially offsets the effect of higher real wages:
wi
pi
= (1− θi)αi
(
Kθii,tL
1−θi
i,t
)ρi
Li,t
[
αi
(
Kθii,tL
1−θi
i,t
)ρi
+ (1− αi) [Qi,t]ρi
] 1
ρi
−1
.
As a result, in the no-intermediates economy, sticky hours fall by more despite a lower
real product wage.
There is a second, more subtle, reason why output decreases by less under the presence
of intermediates. Holding the wage adjustment parameter, γ, fixed, the aggregate price level
falls by more in the economy with intermediates. This follows from the quantity equation:
since output falls by less with intermediates, the price level must fall by more in response
to the fall in money supply. In turn, this implies that the intermediates economy requires
less ”rigid” wages (i.e. a higher value of γ, see Table 5) to match the same increase in the
sticky-sector real consumption wage (Figure 7.F). The smaller distortion, in turn, lessens
the impact of a contractionary monetary shock on hours and output.
Intermediates also dampen the impact of monetary shocks on flexible-sector output (Fig-
ure 7.A). Intuitively, the larger fall in the price of the final good results in a smaller fall in the
flexible sector real consumption wage, and thus a movement along the labor supply schedule.
The flexible labor demand schedule falls more in the economy with no intermediates, where
capital falls by 17% at the trough, than in the economy with intermediates, where capital
and intermediates fall by roughly 12%. These forces combine to result in a smaller fall in
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flexible hours and output in the economy with intermediates. Because of the smaller decline
in the flexible-sector real consumption wage, the average (economy-wide) real wage is higher
in the economy with intermediates than in the no-intermediate case.
An alternative way to show that it is intermediate linkages, rather than sectoral differ-
ences in wage rigidities alone, that are key to our quantitative findings, is to compare our
two-sector environments (with and without intermediates) to a one-sector version based on
the sticky sector. To allow for a direct comparison, we calibrate the wage rigidity param-
eter in the one-sector model so that it generates the same economy-wide real wage over
1929 to to 1933 as the one produced by each of the two-sector economies (with and without
intermediates).30
We find that the one-sector economy and the two-sector economy without intermediates
generate a nearly identical fall in output (compare “No-intermediates” to “One-sector” in
Figure 8.A). However, when we compare the one-sector model to our benchmark economy
with intermediates, we find very different implications. As Figure 9.A shows, output declines
substantially less in the economy with intermediates than in its one-sector counterpart.
We take two key messages from these experiments. First, sectoral heterogeneity in wage
rigidity alone does not imply materially different predictions for the impact of a contrac-
tionary monetary shock than an appropriately calibrated one-sector model. Second, in-
corporating intermediate linkages with sectoral heterogeneity in wage rigidity reduces the
quantitative contribution of high real wages to the Great Contraction.
4.2.1 Discussion: Wage Rigidity, Intermediates and the Great Contraction
While our focus on intermediates is novel, we contribute to a debate over the quantitative
importance of nominal wage rigidity in the U.S. Great Contraction. In this section, we briefly
outline the insights that our work brings to this debate.
In a well cited paper, Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) conclude that wage rigidities
account for roughly 70% of the output decline over 1929 to 1933. In contrast, Cole and
Ohanian (2001) employ a two-sector model to evaluate the impact of high real wages, and
conclude that sticky wages account for less than a sixth of the fall in output. However,
Gertler (2001) and Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2001) argue that both the data and the model
approach raise questions as to the robustness of Cole and Ohanian (2001) findings.
30We choose the other parameters to continue to match the common targets in Table 5.
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Our quantitative analysis in Section 4.2 helps elucidate why Bordo, Erceg, and Evans
(2000) and Cole and Ohanian (2001) reach such different conclusions. We find that it largely
owes to the different aggregate real wage series targeted. When we reproduce the one-
sector model of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) but calibrate the wage rigidity parameter,
γ, to match the economy-wide real wage in our two-sector model without intermediates,
we find a nearly identical output decline (compare “No-intermediates” to “One-sector” in
Figure 8).31 In other words, the two-sector (without intermediates) and one-sector models
have similar aggregate predictions when the wage rigidity parameter is calibrated to match
the same economy-wide average real wage.32 Explicitly modeling intermediates breaks this
equivalence, as our model with intermediates delivers an output decline half as large as that
of a one-sector model calibrated to match the same aggregate real wage.
Although our benchmark experiment yields a slightly larger quantitative contribution
of high real wages to the Great Contraction than Cole and Ohanian (2001), our overall
conclusion is similar. However, our framework addresses the key technical criticisms raised
by Gertler (2001) and Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2001) of the Cole and Ohanian (2001)
exercise. First, our calibration results in a sticky-wage sector roughly twice as large as in
Cole and Ohanian (2001). Second, we explicitly incorporate nominal rigidities in our sectoral
model by “nesting” the one-sector framework of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000). Finally,
we abstract from productivity growth which offsets the impact of wage rigidities. Indeed,
our finding is arguably an upper bound estimate of the contribution of high real wages, since
our benchmark real wage is higher than our data estimate of the economy-wide real wage.33
By modeling intermediates, we address a key critique of the “sectoral hetereogeneity
in wage rigidity” mechanism. In the two-sector model, a contractionary monetary shock
increases the sticky-sector good price relative to the flexible-sector one. This results in a
larger rise in the sticky-sector real consumption wage than in the real product wage. The
question of whether this is consistent with the data is controversial. A common view, cogently
outlined by Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2001) is that since the wholesale price of manufactures
fell by more the GNP deflator (or the COLI), manufacturing real product wages (a proxy
31The γ required to match the same economy-wide real wage varies with model structure.
32Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2011) come to a similar conclusion when they compare one- and
two-sector models for the purpose of explaining differences in cross-country growth.
33Our model generates a lower real economy-wide wage than that targeted by Bordo, Erceg, and Evans
(2000). Their finding of a larger decline in output, shown in Figure 8 as “BEE”, results from targeting a
real wage series close to our sticky-sector estimate, rather than our economy-wide real wage.
24
for the sticky sector) increased relative to manufacturing real consumption wages during the
Great Contraction. As they point out, while a two-sector model with sectoral heterogeneity
in wage rigidities is consistent with the divergence in relative nominal wages across industries,
it is seemingly at odds with the fact that manufacturing real product wages (deflated by the
manufacturing WPI) increase by more than real consumption wages over 1929-33.
Our work suggests that accounting for intermediate prices largely resolves this critique.
The calculations in Section 2.3 show that when one uses the implied value-added deflator to
compute manufacturing’s real product wages, these go up by at most 4% (see Table 4), while
manufacturing’s real consumption wages go up by over 10% (Figure 1.B), which is consistent
with the predictions of our two-sector model with intermediates. This is due to the implied
manufacturing value-added deflator rising by less than the GNP deflator.
This highlights the distinction between gross output and value-added prices with inter-
mediates. Unlike sectoral prices in “standard” value-added models, a sectoral gross output
price is a weighted average of the value-added deflator (itself a weighted average of the input
prices) and the cost of the intermediate bundle. Because this last component is a weighted
average of the sticky and flexible prices, the price of the sticky intermediate bundle (the
dashed line in Figure 3.I) declines relative to its value-added price (the dotted line in Figure
7.H). As we show, this distinction is important during periods of large relative price shifts.
One dimension along which the two-sector model with intermediates cannot match the
data concerns the relationship between the sticky-sector’s gross output price and the GNP
deflator. In the data, the WPI for manufactured goods declines by more than the GNP
deflator due in part to the pass-through of large declines in intermediate prices. In the
model, as we increase the flexible share of intermediate goods in the sticky sector, we find
that the gross output price of the sticky-sector good declines more. However, in a two-sector
model, the price of final output is a weighted average of the two-sectoral goods. As a result,
the sticky sector’s gross output price must decline by less than the price of the final good.
In an environment with three or more sectors, one can construct input-output structures
where the gross output price of at least one sticky-wage sector declines by more than the
price of final output. For example, if one were to divide the sticky sector into two sub-sectors,
with one sector having a large intermediate share of flexible sector goods and the other a
small share, one could easily generate a case where the gross output price in the former
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sector would fall by more than the average price of the final good.34
Finally, one mechanism which we have not discussed is productivity shocks. This reflects
our focus on providing an upper-bound estimate for the contribution of high real wages
to the Great Contraction. To examine how TFP shocks impact our quantitative findings,
we introduce sectoral TFP shocks (together with contractionary monetary shocks) into our
framework. Lacking direct measures of sectoral TFP, we calibrate the sectoral productivity
shocks to match the trough in each sector. Since (negative) productivity shocks lower the
marginal product of labor schedule, this calibration implies a larger fall in hours and a smaller
fall in measured TFP than in the data.35
When we decompose the contribution of TFP shocks and contractionary monetary shocks
to the fall in output, we find that TFP accounts for roughly two-thirds, with the contrac-
tionary monetary shock (sectoral wage rigidity) accounting for a third.36 This decomposition
is broadly consistent with Cole, Ohanian, and Leung (2005), who examine cross-country data
on real wages and output through the lens of a a Lucas (1972)-type misperception model.
Overall, this leads us to conclude that productivity shocks are not a promising mechanism
to overturn our conclusion that nominal wage rigidities were a modest contributor to the
Great Contraction.
5 Conclusion
Our results yield two important messages for the debate over the quantitative role of wage
rigidities during the Great Contraction. First, contractionary monetary shocks coupled with
nominal wage rigidities played a modest role in the downturn. In our benchmark model
with intermediates, we find that wage rigidities account for less than a fifth of the output
decline. This is likely an upper bound, as the economy-wide real wage in the model exceeds
our estimate for the U.S.
Second, we find that the input-output structure of the economy is quantitatively impor-
tant for the debate over the role of sectoral heterogeneity in wage rigidity in this period.
34This parametrization is consistent with the data, as manufacturing had a much higher intermediate
share than the sticky-sector average.
35We use measured TFP from Amaral and MacGee (2002). See the Web Appendix for more details on
this experiment.
36We also find that real wages do little to amplify the effect of productivity, as the fall in output when we
run both experiments is roughly equal to the sum of what we find if we input the shocks separately.
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Our comparison of the two-sector model (without intermediates) with a one-sector version
suggests that the Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) and Cole and Ohanian (2001) debate
is largely about different views on aggregate real wages during the Great Contraction, as
we find nearly identical declines in output when one targets the same aggregate real wage.
Importantly, however, the introduction of intermediates breaks this link, as our model with
intermediates delivers half as large an output decline compared with a one-sector model
calibrated to match the same aggregate real wage.
While we focus on the U.S. experience, nominal wage rigidities are also cited as a key
factor in accounting for the cross-country nature of the Great Depression, with Eichengreen
and Sachs (1985) and Bernanke and Carey (1996) arguing that deflation experiences are
correlated with cross-country variation in measured real product wages. Our results suggest
that a closer examination of the empirical work on cross-country real wage data and economic
performance during the Great Depression is warranted. Several authors (e.g., Eichengreen
and Hatton (1988)) have argued that using the WPI for manufactured goods, instead of the
WPI itself, corrects for the large fall in the price of unprocessed intermediates. Our findings
suggest that this approach likely overstates the rise in real product wages, and that using
manufacturing real product wages as a proxy for the real wage may be misleading.
Finally, our findings also suggest that while the multi-sectoral linkages we examine are
important in accounting for the sectoral disparities observed during the Great Contraction,
they must have interacted with other price shocks, as contractionary monetary shocks on
their own fail to generate enough action in output. We conjecture that modeling international
trade, particularly in commodities, where price changes were very significant in this period,
might be a fruitful avenue to pursue in future research regarding the cross-country spread of
the Great Depression.
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Table 1: Sectoral labor market statistics (per adult, 1929=100)
Hours Worked
Year Agric. Constr. Retail FIRE Flex. Manuf. Transp. Gov. Min. Serv. Wholesale Sticky Total
1929 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1930 97.6 91.3 92.6 94.9 95.0 83.5 89.9 101.3 83.3 93.9 93.1 89.6 91.9
1931 98.0 80.7 85.0 88.6 91.0 67.2 75.3 100.8 64.3 85.8 82.4 77.5 83.5
1932 93.4 64.5 75.3 81.8 83.1 53.0 60.8 96.6 49.0 76.0 72.4 65.5 73.4
1933 92.0 53.5 73.9 77.7 80.3 56.1 56.3 113.7 51.4 72.5 71.2 66.4 72.6
Real Wages
Year Agric. Constr. Retail FIRE Flex. Manuf. Transp. Gov. Min. Serv. Wholesale Sticky Total
1929 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1930 78.2 92.3 99.6 95.4 91.1 104.0 103.8 104.5 106.2 102.5 103.7 104.4 98.9
1931 65.4 80.6 99.9 97.4 84.2 109.1 112.4 116.3 109.0 106.6 107.4 111.1 99.6
1932 49.5 59.3 91.6 98.9 72.6 108.7 116.8 127.9 111.30 107.4 103.5 113.5 96.3
1933 55.7 53.3 85.1 98.0 70.5 106.0 115.2 113.3 106.3 101.8 92.7 111.5 94.2
% Self-Employed
Year Agric. Constr. Retail FIRE Flex. Manuf. Transp. Gov. Min. Serv. Wholesale Sticky Total
1929 66 36 31 10 - 1 4 0 2 21 6 - 23
Source: Hours data from Kendrick (1961). Hours are per working-age person.
Note: Transp. is Transportation, Communications and Public Utilities.
Table 2: Price Indices (1929=100)
COLI
Year GNP Defl. WPI (Man.) VA Defl. (Man.) All Food Cloth Rent Fuel H. Furn. Misc.
1929 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1930 96.9 93.1 100.8 97.5 95.1 97.7 97.2 99.0 97.5 100.5
1931 88.1 81.5 92.1 88.7 78.4 89.0 92.1 96.8 87.7 99.5
1932 78.4 74.4 89.9 79.7 65.3 78.8 82.7 91.9 76.5 97.2
1933 76.7 74.6 81.2 75.4 63.5 76.2 71.2 88.9 75.4 94.1
Source: GNP deflator is from Balke and Gordon (1986).
COLI data is from Table 5 in Cost of Living in 1941, BLS Bulletin No. 710.
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Table 3: Industry Wholesale Output and Main Input Price (1929=100)
WPI (GO) WPI (Main Input)
Industry 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Automobile 100 94.2 89.8 87.9 84.4 100 93.9 87.8 83.7 82.8
Boots and Shoes 100 96.0 88.1 81.0 84.9 100 89.5 76.1 57.5 63.1
Iron and Steel 100 93.9 87.8 83.7 82.8 100 101.3 100.6 100.4 98.1
Meat-Packing 100 90.2 69.1 53.3 45.8 100 84.1 60.2 45.4 40.9
Paper and Pulp 100 96.9 91.6 84.9 86.2 100 95.1 85.8 74.5 60.9
Leather 100 89.5 76.1 57.5 63.1 100 80.7 53.4 37.3 59.5
Wool Man 100 89.5 77.2 65.3 78.5 100 70.4 51.5 36.9 59.1
Manufacturing 100 93.1 81.5 74.4 74.6 100 87.1 73.5 63.2 69.5
Source: See the Web Appendix. The input price indices are based on the main input for each
industry. For manufacturing, the input price index is for semi-manufactured goods (the values for
the index of raw materials are 100, 86.5, 67.3, 56.5, 57.9).
Table 4: Real Product Wages (1929=100)
VA Deflator (CES) WPI Deflator
Industry 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Automobile 100 105.9 105.8 90.7 96.5 100 106.5 109.2 99.7 103.9
Boots and Shoes 100 90.9 84.1 70.3 79.0 100 98.3 98.6 99.9 107.5
Iron and Steel 100 118.1 131.1 105.5 119.5 100 107.7 110.8 97.1 96.7
Meat-Packing 100 75.0 66.2 65.4 96.0 100 113.7 142.5 156.7 182.8
Paper and Pulp 100 100.7 97.6 84.4 59.9 100 103.5 107.4 101.7 94.8
Leather 100 83.3 54.0 47.0 88.3 100 112.5 126.31 152.3 135.8
Wool Man 100 84.9 79.1 65.0 75.1 100 113.8 126.3 121.9 105.7
Manufacturing 100 99.1 103.9 93.8 102.7 100 107.3 117.4 113.4 111.5
Source: Wage data is from the NICB and the industry wholesale price deflators are from various
issues of Wholesale Prices. The manufacturing input price series is semi-finished materials.
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Table 5: Calibration
Parameter Value Target
β 0.99 Annual risk-free rate 4%
δ 0.025 Annual depreciation rate 10%
σL -0.5 Frisch elasticity of 2
η 0.36 Flexible sector’s share of GDP in 1929: 41%
g 0.0015 Estimated from M1 data
γ 0.05 Sticky sector’s real consumption wage path (1929-1933)
µL 7.3345 Total market time of 1/3
µM 0.013 BEE (2000)
φi 0.25 Quarterly contracts
ρm 0.44 Estimated from M1 data
ρ -1.96 Path of Flexible sector’s share of GDP (1929-1933)
θ1 0.3 Capital income share of 30%
θ2 0.3 Capital income share of 30%
α1 0.8750 Intermediates’ share (Flexible sector): 32%
α2 0.8410 Intermediates’ share (Sticky sector): 38%
ρ1 -0.4493 Elasticity of substitution between value-added and intermediates: 0.69
ρ2 -0.4493 Elasticity of substitution between value-added and intermediates: 0.69
χ1 0.7888 Flexible intermediates’ share (flexible sector): 39%
χ2 0.5545 Flexible intermediates’ share (sticky sector): 31%
No-intermediates version
Parameter Value Target
η 0.34 Flexible sector’s share of GDP in steady-state: 41%
γ 0.02 Sticky sector’s real consumption wage path (1929-1933)
ρ -0.82 Path of flexible sector’s share of GDP (1929-1933)
One-sector versions
Parameter Value Target
γ 0.0087 Real manufacturing wage (1929-1933) from Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000)
γ 0.0822 Economy-wide real wage (1929-1933) from no-intermediates model
γ 0.0232 Economy-wide real wage (1929-1933) from benchmark
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Figure 1: Data estimates
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Figure 2: Benchmark with intermediates: aggregate variables
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Figure 3: Benchmark with intermediates: sectoral variables
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis: sectoral good production substitutability
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis: final good production substitutability
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Figure 6: No intermediates: aggregate variables
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Figure 7: No intermediates: sectoral variables
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Figure 8: Comparison: no-intermediates vs. one-sector
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Figure 9: Comparison: intermediates vs. one-sector
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